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however, refused to publish the rule
because it had not been presented to
the General Assembly's Joint
Committee on Administrative Rules
(JCAR) for review, as was required
by state administrative procedure.'
The absence of JCAR review and
the refusal of the Secretary of State
by Stephen Davis
to publish the rule in the Missouri
Register resulted in the failure of the
I. INTRODUCTION
mental and other special interests as rule's formal promulgation." The
As expected, the Missouri to howeffective the decision will be rule's failure brought one environSupreme Court has declared the and what now lies ahead.
mental organization, the Missouri
Missouri General Assembly's legis- II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Coalition for the Environment, and
lative veto power of administrative
In 1992, the Missouri some of its members to challenge
agency rules unconstitutional.' The Department of Natural Resources state administrative procedure reU.S. Supreme Court declared (DNR) proposed a new administra- garding JCAR's review of proCongress' legislative veto power tive rule pursuant to its rulemaking posed rules.'
unconstitutional in 1983, and since authority under the Missouri Solid
The Missouri Coalition for
then, many have speculated about Waste
Management
Law the Environment (MCE) brought
whether the Missouri Supreme (MSWML) and submitted it to the suit in the Circuit Court of St. Louis
Court would follow suit. Accord- Secretary of State for publication. County against various state offiing to some, the question has been The rule would have required those cials ("the State") seeking a writ of
not if, but rather when the legislative applying for DNR permits for mandamus to compel the Secretary
veto would be struck down in landfills and waste processing of State to publish the rule, a
Missouri.' However, the Missouri plants to document that they had declaratory judgment pronouncing
Court's treatment of the issues complied with all applicable zoning the Missouri General Assembly's
involved as well as the legislature's and licensing requirements of the legislative veto unconstitutional,
response to the ruling raise new area in which they were to be and an injunction to prevent JCAR
questions in the minds of environ- located. The Secretary of State, from taking further action.! MCE
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MISSOURI
LEGISLATIVE VETO:
AN ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP'S EFFECT ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE
Missouri Coalitionfor the Environment v. Joint Committee on
Administrative Rules'

'948 S.W.2d 125 (Mo. 1997).
'See generallyKenneth Dean,LegislativeVeto ofAdministrativeRules inMissouri:A ConstitutionalVirus, 57 Mo. L. Rev. 1157(1992);
Scott Welman,JointConnitteeonAdministrativeRules:TheMissouriLegislature'sDisregarifor
theMissouriConstitution,58UMKC

L. Rev. 113 (1989).
'See Dean, supra note 2. Professor Dean concludes his analysis stating: "At some point the right case will arise challenging the powers of
the [Joint Committee on Administrative Rules]. It should come as no surprise to anyone when those powers are ruled unconstitutional." Id.
at 1216. The Court in the instant case begins its analysis by quoting Professor Dean's comment, hinting that it was now fulfilling his
prediction. SeeMo. Coalitionfor theEnv't, 948 S.W.2d at 125.
"Mo. Coalitionfor the Env't, 948 S.W.2d at 129.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 260.225 (Supp. 1990). Section 260.225.4 provides: "[n]o rule or portion of a rule promulgated under the [Missouri Solid

Waste Management Law] shall become effective until it has been approved by the joint committee on administrative rules."
Subsection 5 goes on to say: "[tihe [DNR] shall not file any final order of rulemaking with the secretary of state until twenty
days after such final order ofrulemaking has been received by the committee."
The state administrative procedure act is codified at Mo. REv. STAT. Chapter 536. In 1995, legislative veto provisions
affecting many state agencies, including the DNR, were moved from their individual enabling acts to the state administrative procedure
act in § 536.024. See infra note 92.
'Id.
'Mo. Coalitionfor the Env't, 948 S.W.2d at 130-31.

'The Missouri Coalition for the Environment is a non-profit corporation, comprised ofapproximately 15,000 members, with its principal
office located in St. Louis, Missouri. The self-expressed purposes of the Coalition are "promoting, preserving and protecting the
environment inthe State ofMissouri." Legal File at 83. The three individual relators include Karen Zurick, BeverlyToner, and Darby Tally-all members ofMCE.
Respondents include the Joint Committee on Administrative Rules and all of its members: State Senators Jeff Schaeperkoetter,
Franc Flotron, Emory Melton, Norman Merrell, John Schneider and Representatives Steve Carroll, Raymond Hand, David Klarich, Kaye
Steinmetz, and Vernon Thompson. The Secretary of State, Roy Blunt, the Department ofNatural Resources, and its Acting Director, Ron
Kucera, were also named as respondents.
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claimed that the Secretary of State's
refusal to publish the final version
of the regulation deprived it and
state citizens of the rule's intended
beneficial effects, including a
decrease in both noise and stench
near landfills.9 It also complained
that JCAR's broad power of review
of administrative rules crossed the
line of legislative authority-that the
General Assembly had, in effect,
granted itself executive authorityand that JCAR was unconstitutionally spending taxpayer money in the
course of its duties.' 0
When MCE filed its action
in 1992, the legislative veto
provisions relating to DNR rules
were surprisingly bold considering
the U.S. Supreme Court's treatment
of congressional vetoes almost ten
years earlier." Under the version of
section 260.225 in effect at the time,
the legislature empowered JCAR,
without approval from the General
Assembly, to either disapprove of a
proposed DNR rule within twenty
days after it was filed with the
Committee, or suspend any rule

already promulgated. 2 After MCE
filed suit, the legislature amended
DNR's rulemaking authority under
section 260.225 in 1993 and again
in 1995.13 On April 18, 1994, DNR
officially withdrew its final order of
rulemaking which the Secretary of
State had refused to publish."
The Circuit Court granted
JCAR's motion for summary judgment, ruling the case moot since the
final order of rulemaking had been
withdrawn by DNR, the statute had
been amended since the action was
commenced, and the legislature had
not actually exercised its veto
authority."
On direct appeal to the
Supreme Court, the Court reversed,
holding that both MCE and its three
individual members had standing to
sue, that amendment of the statute
or withdrawal of the rule did not
render the case moot, and that the
case was ripe for adjudication.' 6 It
also held that the 1990 version of
section 260.225 was unconstitutional, since it violated the separation of powers and presentment

requirements of the state constitution." However, the Court stressed
that the legislature is free to
authorize committees to review
regulatory actions of the executive
department and take such action as
is constitutionally allowed." In so
ruling, the Court specified that its
holding was "limited only. to the
constitutional inability of the legislature to unilaterally suspend or
veto such regulatory action." 9 In
sum, the Supreme Court held that
the legislature may not, without
violating the constitution, "unilaterally suspend or veto" administrative
rules promulgated by executive
agencies. 20
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The authority of JCAR has

constantly evolved since its inception. The Committee was established by the General Assembly in
1975 as a joint committee with five
members from each house.2' At
first, JCAR's role was merely to
review new regulations proposed by
state executive agencies and then
make recommendations to the

'Mo. Coalitionfor the Env't, 948 S.W.2d at 128.
"Id.
"See generally INS v. Chadha, infra note 44.
"Mo. REv. STAT. § 260.225.4-.6 (Supp. 1990). Subsection 4 provides: "[ulpon filing any proposed rule with the secretary of state, the

department shall concurrently submit such proposed rule to the committee which may hold hearings upon any proposed rule and may
disapprove any proposed rule or portion thereof at any time."
Subsection 6 allows for suspension ofany rule at any time: "[amny rule or portion ofa rule promulgated under the authority of [the
MSWML] may be suspended by the committee at any time after a hearing conducted thereon."
"While the 1993 amendment changed the JCAR's procedure ofreview, the 1995 amendment's only significant purpose was to reorganize
many legislative veto provisions into one section. See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 260.225.7-.10 (Supp. 1993) and 260,225 (Supp. 1995). See also
Mo. Coalitionforthe Env 't, 948 S.W.2d at 129-31.
'uMo. Coalitionfor the Env't, 948 S.W.2d at 131.
5Id. at 131.

"Id. at 135-36.
"Id. The Court held the section unconstitutional "insofar as it purported 1)to suspend publication and promulgation of the DNR's final
orders of rulemaking for up to twenty days while the JCAR reviewed such rules-2) to prevent promulgation and enforcement of DNR rules
the JCAR disapproved, and 3) to permit the JCAR to suspend and withdraw rules already promulgated by the DNR." Id.
"Id.at 136.
"Id.
nId.

"Mo. REv. STAT. § 536.037.1 (Supp. 1975). The statute provides: "[tlhere is established a permanent joint committee of the general
assemblytobe known as the'Committee onAdministrative Rules', which shall be composed of five members ofthe senate and five members
of the house ofrepresentatives. The senate members of the committee shall be appointed by the president pro tem of the senate and the house
members by the speaker of the house. The appointment ofeach member shall continue during his term ofomfice as a member ofthe general
assembly unless sooner removed. No major party shall be represented by more than three appointed members from either house."
For a comprehensive history of the legislative veto in Missouri until 1992, see Dean, supranote 2 at 1161-66.
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Assembly and other state officials
based on its findings. 2 2 Thus, the
Committee was initially used only
as a "watchdog," possessing no veto
power, and able to see its recommendations become reality only
through legislation or by asserting
pressure through hearings.? At this
point, JCAR's authority was not
constitutionally problematic. 24
However, this measured
authority did not remain static. The
legislature believed that the executive branch had too much control
over implementing law through
administrative rulemaking and
wanted to reign in such autonomy
by increasing its own powers of
agency oversight.25 Starting in
1979, the legislature tried to invest
JCAR with the power to lodge
complaints with the Administrative
Hearing Commission (AHC) to
challenge the validity of agency
rules. 6 Filing such a complaint
would result in the suspension of the
rule at issue until the AHC had
determined whether the rule had

violated the agency's rulemaking
authority.27 This arrangement was
not effective in producing its
desired results, however; and although still on the books, these
provisions were left unutilized.28 In
1982, this grant of authority to
JCAR was finally pronounced
unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court. 9 It went on to say that the
legislature, by empowering AHC to
invalidate administrative rules, was
in effect, "elevat[ing]" the Commission to the "status of a court." 0
According to the Missouri Constitution, the legislature has no power to
create courts and "cannot turn an
administrative agency into a court
by granting it power that has been
constitutionally reserved to the
judiciary."3' The legislature was
left to find another way to control
the content of agency rules.32
In 1986, the legislature
amended section 260.225 to allow
JCAR to actually disapprove of
DNR rules. 33 Two years later, the
statute was again amended to

include a provision enabling JCAR
to suspend, or essentially nullify,
any rule previously published and
promulgated under the MSWML
after it had conducted a hearing on
the rule." Thus, any previously
promulgated DNR regulation was
at risk to the whims of just a few
legislators on this key committee.
The section also included a
nonseverability clause stating that if
JCAR's "review power" were ever
held to be unconstitutional or
otherwise held invalid, DNR's
rulemaking authority as well as any
rule promulgated by it would also
be void.3 1 In 1990, the section was
amended again, but not in a way that
affected the legislative veto power
of JCAR.3
The Assembly maintained
its fervent pace, and in 1993,
revised the statute yet again, this
time after the Secretary of State
refused to publish the DNR rule at
issue and JCAR's authority was
under fire." This time, however,
the legislature effected a substantial

"Mo. REV. STAT. §536.037.3-.4(Supp. 1975). Subsection 3 provides: "[t]he committee shall reviewall rules promulgated byanyagency....
In its review the committee may take such action as it deems necessary which may include holding hearings."
Subsection 4 provides: "[ilfthe committee finds that any rule...should be amended or rescinded in whole or in part, it shall report
such findings and recommendations to the general assembly, to the commissioner ofadministration, and to the elected state officer, if any,
who promulgated the rule."
"Dean, supra note 2, at 1162.
241d.
"See Welman, supra note 2, at 115 (citing Mo. GENERAL ASSEMBLY JOINT COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE RULES, REPORT ON THE CHANGING
SCOPE AND INCREASING WORKLOAD OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE RULES, 83rd Gen. Assembly at 3 (1986)).

"See Dean, supra note 2, at 1163, 1217-19 (examples cited by Professor Dean where the JCAR is granted authority to file complaints
include: Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 344.070 (enacted 1969; amended 1979), 198.009 (enacted 1979), and 630.050 (enacted 1980)).
1"Id.

nDean, supra note 2, at 1163.
"State Tax Comm'n v. Admin. Hearing Comm'n, 641 S.W.2d 69 (Mo. 1982) (en banc). The AHC had been empowered in 1978 by the
General Assembly "to render declaratory judgments regarding the validity of agency rules." Id. at 73. The Court held that the grant of
authority from the legislature to the AHC was an "abuse that flowed from centralization of power" and hence contrary to the doctrine of
separation ofpowers because the suspension ofthe rule was a purelyjudicial remedy.
"Admin. Heaning Comm'n, 641 S.W.2d at 73-75.
"Id. at 76.
"Id. at 73-76. See also Mo. REv. STAT. §§161.333, 536.050 (1978).
"Mo. REV. STAT. § 260.225 (Supp. 1986).
"Mo. REv. STAT. § 260.225.4 (Supp. 1988). The statute provided that"any rule orportionofa rule promulgated under [theMSWML] may
be suspended by the committee at any time after a hearing conducted thereon."
"Mo. REV. STAT. § 260.225.5 (Supp. 1988). This provision states: "[ijf the review power is held unconstitutional or invalid, the grant of
rulemaking authority and any rule promulgated under such rulemaking authority shall also be invalid or void." Id.
"Mo. REv. STAT. § 260.225 (Supp. 1990). Most significantly, the 1990 amendment added two new sections dealing with a legislative
directive for the DNR to prepare model solid waste management plans. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 260.225.2-.3.
"Id.
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change, trying to legitimize and
strengthen the veto against attack by
relinquishing some of its power and
clarifying that the delegated DNR
rulemaking authority was conditional. 8 JCAR's authority was
restricted in that no longer would
the Committee be allowed to
suspend any rule at any time." It
could only suspend rules within a
thirty-day time period before the
final order of rulemaking is filed
with the Secretary of State and only
upon specific, newly-specified
grounds.4 In addition, the Committee could no longer suspend DNR
regulatons unilaterally-the concurrence of the Senate and House of
Representatives by resolution was
now necessary for a permanent
suspension.
The legislature
strengthened its grip on the veto
power by reestablishing and emphasizing the nonseverability clause of
the pre-amended versions.42
The legislature acted again
in 1995 to revise DNR, as well as
many other agencies', rulemaking

authorization. However, instead of
radically realtering JCAR's authority, the 1995 revision was geared
toward centralization of various
legislative veto provisions in many
individual agency enabling statutes
into the state administrative procedure law. The amendment repealed
the 1993 version of the veto
provisions in section 260.225 and
incorporated them into a new
section to Chapter 536, section
536.024." The amendment left
unchanged the specific requirements of rule suspension the 1993
amendment imposed on JCAR and
the legislature as a whole.
Traditionally, the major
argument against the legislative
veto has centered on separation of
powers. 45 The doctrine is more
carefully defined, however, in the
Missouri structure of government
than it is at the federal level. 4
Although the U.S. Constitution only
implies separation ofpowers through
its organization and delegation of
duties to each branch, the Missouri

Constitution explicitly commands
that each branch of state government is to be separate, distinct, and
not encroach upon the authority of
the others. 7 In addition, the bounds
of the legislature are more explicitly
defined in the state constitution."
The General Assembly twice attempted, by proposing constitutional amendments granting it a
legislative veto, to push the constitutional envelope, but both referenda failed at the ballot box.4 9
The year after the Missouri
Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Administrative Hearing
Commission, the U.S. Supreme

Court declared congressional legislative vetoes unconstitutional.- In
its landmark decision in INS v.
Chadha, the Court primarily relied
on the Presentment and Bicameral
Clauses of the Constitution in ruling
that legislative vetoes of one house
of Congress violated separation of
powers." Speaking for the Court,
Chief Justice Burger explained
federal separation of powers:

38
Id.
9

Id.
'oMo REv. STAT. § 260.225.4-.7. Subsection 7 provides: "[t]he committee may, by majority vote of the members, suspend the order of
rulemaking or portion thereofbyaction takenpriorto the filing ofthe final order of rulemaking only for one or more of the following grounds:
(1) An absence ofstatutory authority for the proposed rule;
(2) An emergency relating to public health, safety or welfare;
(3) The proposed rule is in conflict with state law;
(4) A substantial change in circumstance since enactment of the law upon which the propsed rule is based" (emphasis supplied).
Mo REv. STAT. § 260.225.7.
"'Mo. REv. STAT. §260.225.4 (Supp. 1993).
"Id. The subsection states: "[tihe delegation of the legislative authority to enact law by the adoption of such rules is dependent upon the
power of the joint committee on administrative rules to review and suspend rules pending ratification by the senate and the house of
representatives as provided herein."
43
Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 260.225 and 536.024 (Supp. 1995).
"Id.

Dean, supra note 2, at 1190.
"Id.

Dean, supra note 2, at 1190. Mo. CoNsT. art. II,§ I provides: "[tihe powers ofgovernment shall be divided into three distinct departments-the legislative, executive and judicial--each of which shall be confided to a separate magistracy, and no person, or collection ofpersons,
charged with the exercise ofpowers properly belonging to one of those departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either
of the others, except in the instances in this constitution expressly directed or permitted."
"See Mo. CoNsT. art. M, §21: "[n]o law shall be passed except by bill." See also Mo. Coalition for the Env't. 948 S.W.2d at 134.
"Missouri CoalitionfortheEnv 't, 948 S.W.2d at 129. The legislature's twoproposed amendments to the state constitution, Senate Joint
Resolution No. 29 and House Resolution No. 36 were defeated in 1976 and 1982 respectively. Id. See also Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 173.612,
197.445, and 277.160.
5INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919(1983).
"Id at 947-952. Rex Lee, the U.S. Solicitor General whoargued before theSupremeCourt inChadha, laterremarked thatthecase was"one
ofthehalf-dozen most important cases ever decided by the Supreme Court." Rex Lee, Brigham Young University constitutional law lecture
(March 1994).
4

96

MELPR

Constitutionality of Missouri Legislative Veto
the Constitution sought to
divide the delegated powers of
the new federal
go v ernment into three defined
categories, legislative, executive and judicial, to assure, as
nearly as possible, that each
Branch of government would
confine itself to its assigned
responsibility. The hydraulic
pressure inherent within each
of the separate Branches to
exceed the outer limits of its
power, even to accomplish
desirable objectives, must be
resisted.s2
Thus, the U.S. Supreme
Court determined that a unicameral
disapproval of administrative regulations violated the doctrine of
separation of powers inherent in the
federal Constitution.
With the
express statement of the Missouri
Constitution, Article II, section 1, a
Missouri court would have an easier
time ruling that such an action
would violate state separation of
powers.
The effects of Chadha
were far-reaching. Chadha appears
to require, on statutes containing
legislative veto provisions, a caseby-case examination of whether the
veto can be severed from the rest of
the act.54 Instead of Congress
provoking a fight, it will probably
refuse to veto administrative rules
when a statute authorizes such.ss In
fact, since "the mere presence of an

unexercised legislative veto provision in a statute may invalidate" the
whole statute, because of the
severability issue, commentators
suggest it would serve the legislature well, to not only keep quiet
about its dormant legislative veto
provisions, but also amend such
laws to correct any problems
waiting to happen. '
Three years later, the U.S.
Supreme Court, in Bowsher v.
Synar, again struck down a legislative encroachment upon executive
authority." Citing Chadha, the
Court held that congressionally
granted authority under GramnmRudman to the Comptroller General
was executive in nature and
unconstitutional since the Comptroller General could only be
removed from office by Congress.s
Again, Chief Justice Berger explained separation of legislative and
executive authority:
To permit the execution of the
laws to be vested in an officer answerable only to Congress would,
in practical terms, reserve in Congress control of the execution of
the laws .... The structure of the
Constitution does not permitCongress to execute its laws; it follows that Congress cannot grant
to an officer under its control what
it does not possess.59
The Court explained that
allowing the Comptroller General
to act in the way Congress had

intended would be, "in essence, to
permit a congressional veto."60 In
fact, the Court added, "[this kind of
congressional control over the
execution of the laws, Chadha
makes clear, is constitutionally
impermissible. "6' According to the
U.S. Supreme Court, therefore, a
grant of authority by the legislature
to itself, or an officer under its
exclusive control, to execute the
laws is an unconstitutional violation
of separation of powers.62
Finally, in late September
1997, the Missouri Supreme Court
issued its decision in State Auditor
v. Joint Committee on Legislative

Research, in which it favorably
relied on its previous decisions in
both Administrative Hearing Com-

mission and the instant case.63 In
this case, the court determined that
the Missouri doctrine of separation
of powers as stated in Article II,
section 1 of the state constitution,
precludes action by the Joint
Committee on Legislative Research
to conduct an audit of the state
auditor's office." The court quoted
Chadha for the proposition that
separation of powers "may be
violated when one branch assumes a
[power]... that more properly

to another."65

is

It also cited
entrusted
its interpretation of Bowsher by
saying that "[o]nce the legislature
makes its choice in enacting
legislation, its participation ends.""
By applying Chadha and Bowsher,

"Id. at 951.
3
Id.
5'NoWAK AND ROTUNDA, TREATISE ON CONSTITIMONAL LAw, 5th ed. § 7.15
55
Y.
'6Id.
"Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
n17d. at 726.
"Id.
60
1d.
'1 d. at 726-27.
QId.
63
State Auditor v. Joint Conunittee on Legislative Research, No. 79454, 1997 WL 731529 (Mo.
Sept. 30, 1997).
"Id. at *3.
6
1d. (quoting Chadha,462 U.S. at 963).
"Id.
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Missouri has indisputably stated
that the legislature is not justified in
encroaching upon the executive
function.
IV. INSTANT DECISION

The

Missouri

Supreme

Court in Missouri Coalitionfor the
Environment v. Joint Committee on
Administrative Rules ruled that

disapproval by the Missouri General Assembly of executive agency
administrative rules was unconstitutional." It reasoned that it was a
violation of the state constitution
for the legislature to grant additional power to itself in areas
reserved for the executive branch.s6
Section 260.225 (Supp. 1990) of
the Missouri Revised Statutes
mandates prior approval of all DNR
rules by JCAR before the Secretary
of State may officially publish
them.69 The statute also authorized
JCAR to disapprove of previously
promulgated rules enacted under
MSWML and supend and withdraw
them.o
As noted above, the
legislature then amended its legislative veto power in 1993 and again in

ing for both the Secretary of State's
refusal to publish and the constitutional issues at stake," The Court
reiterated its position that public
citizens, when seeking orders of
mandamus against state officials,
have a right to performance of those
officials' "ministerial duties.'" 3 It
explained by stating that where the
duty to be performed is simple,
mandated by statute, and routine,
the standing threshold for a member
of the public is "extremely low.'" 4
Since the ministerial duty at issue
was a routine one mandated by
statute, over which the Secretary
had no discretion as to compliance,
the standing requirement was satisfied."
The Court also ruled in
favor of standing for the individuals
to sue on the constitutional issue of
state funding of JCAR's expenses. 6
When the assembly established
JCAR, it provided that "members
of the committee ... may receive

their necessary expenses while
attending the meetings of the
committee, to be paid out of the
joint contingent fund.'" 7
As
1995.
The Court first addressed taxpayers, the individual relators
the issue of standing. 7' It ruled that would have standing to sue the
the individual residents had stand- Committee if they alleged an

illegal, "direct expenditure of funds
generated through taxation." 8 Since
the complainants alleged that JCAR
expended funds in this manner
between 1986 and 1992, they
fulfilled the sufficiency requirements for standing on the constitutional claim. 9
The Court found that
MCE's lobbying effort and concern
for enforcement of MSWML,
especially since the group did not
claim any "concrete injury beyond
non-implementation of its preferred
policy choices," was insufficient to
afford standing.' Alternatively, the
coalition argued associational standing, claiming that it brought the
action on behalf of its members who
resided near waste disposal areas.'
This specific claim was dismissed
as moot since the individual relators
had already been granted personal
standing.82
The Court began its discussion of the constitutional claim by
establishing both its reverence for
legislative action and its authority
of judicial review.83
Quoting
Asbury v. Lombardi, it declared that

"we presume a statute is valid unless
it clearly contradicts a constitutional

provision."8 4 The court then cited

'Mo. Coalitionfor the EnvO, 948 S.W.2d at 133-35.
"Id.

"Mo. REv. STAT. §260.225.4-.5 (Supp. 1990) provides: "[njo rule or portionofa rule promulgated under the authority of [chapter 260] shall
become effective until it has been approved by the joint committee on administrative rules.... If any proposed rule or portion thereof is
disapproved by the committee, the secretary ofstate shall publish in the Missouri Register... an order that such rule or portion thereofhas
been disapproved."
"Mo. REv. STAT. §260.225.6 (Supp. 1990).
"Mo. Coalitionfor the Envt, 948 S.W.2d at 131.
72
1d.

"Id.(quoting State ex rel. Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit v. Jones, 823 S.W.2d 471, 475 (Mo. 1992)).
ulId. (quoting State ex rel. Cabool v. Texas County Bd. of Equalization, 850 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Mo. 1993)).
nId.
"Id.

"Id. (quoting Mo. REv. STAT. § 536.037.5 (1975)).
"Id. (quoting Harris v. Missouri Gaming Comm'n, 869 S.W.2d 58,60 (Mo. 1994)).
7Id.
8Id. at 132.
81ld.
"Id.

'Id. (quoting Asbury v. Lombardi, 846 S.W.2d 196, 199 (Mo. 1993)).

98

MELPR

Constitutionality of Missouri Legislative Veto
the assertion of Chief Justice
Marshall-that "it is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is,"
adding to that a clarifier, "to
determine the constitutionality of
statutes."85 This statement reaffirms the Court's judicial power to
overrule a law as unconstitutional.86
With its authority thus defined, the
Court progressed to the Missouri
separation of powers doctrine.87
According to the doctrine
of separation of powers in Missouri,
each branch of government should
be "kept as separate from and
independent from, each other as the
nature of free government will
admit, or as is consistent with that
chain of connection which binds the
whole fabric of the Constitution in
one indissoluble bond of union and
amity."" The Court also maintained, according to long established interpretation of the Missouri
Constitution, that one branch was
not to encroach upon the duties of
another without express constitutional mandate.89 The constitution,
the court affirmed, "peremptorily
forbids either of such departments

from passing the prohibitory precincts thus ordained by the exercise
of powers properly belonging to
either of the others."0 It then
determined that legislature's encroachment in authorizing JCAR
was not merely an "overlap of
powers" but a a violation of
constitutional separation of powers
in two respects.91 First, the statute
allows the legislature to "unconstitutionally interfere with the functions of the executive branch." 2
Second,
it
allows
the
"circumvent[ion
of]
the
constitution's bill passage and
presentment requirements."9 1
On the first violation, the
court firmly pronounced that article
II, section I of the Missouri
Constitution limits the authority of
the legislature to enacting laws, as
opposed to enforcing those laws
which it has enacted.94 The court
stated that JCAR's statutory authority under section 260.225 to review,
suspend publication of, and disapprove of DNR administrative rules,
as well as its power to suspend rules
already promulgated, is a power
reserved by the constitution to the

executive branch. 95 Article IV,
sections 16 and 47 of the constitution direct that the promulgation of
rules and regulations is solely an
executive function.
Once the
legislature has delegated rulemaking
powers, its control is at an end, and
is not at liberty to exercise direct
control over what rules are promulgated.' The Court clarified that the
legislature may, of course, exercise
its oversight function.97
On alternate grounds, the
Court invoked the passage and
presentment requirement of the
constitution to bar JCAR's action."
Since administrative rules have the
force and effect of law, it reasoned,
it is necessarily inferred that they
may only be defeated by the
legislature through subsequent law.9"
The Court then explained that since
the constitution stipulates that "no
law shall be passed [by the
legislature] except by bill," and that
every bill passed by both houses
must be presented to the Governor,
the type of legislative action in this
case failed to comply with the
constitution's passage and presentTherefore,
ment requirements.'

"Ild.

"Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137).
vId.

"Id. at 132-33 (quoting Rhodes v. Bell, 130 S.W. 465,468 (Mo. 1910)).
"Id.

"Id. at 133 (quoting Albright v. Fisher, 64 S.W. 106,108-09 (Mo. 1901)). The Missouri Constitution states: "[t]he powers ofgovernment
shall be divided into three distinct departments-the legislative, executive and judicial-each of which shall be confided to a separate
magistracy, and no person, or collection of persons, charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of those departments, shall
exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except inthe instances in this constitution expressly directed or permitted."
Mo. CONST. art. II, § 1.
"Mo. Coalitionforthe Env't, 948 S.W.2d at 133.
2
Id.
'3 Id.
HId.
95
Md.
"Id.at 134.

"Id. at 136. When established, the JCAR was authorized to hold hearings on DNR proposed rules and submit recommendations based on
its findings to the legislature and executive officials. Naturally, the General Assembly could act in accordance with the Committee's
recommendations through legislation. In this process, even though legislation might not be proposed, pressure could be effectively asserted
on the DNR to withdraw or modify its proposed rule, especially pressure brought by an appropriations committee to curtail or qualify agency
funding or another committee to hold hearings, delay appointments, etc. The Court maintained that these oversight procedures are
completely appropriate and do not leave the legislature helpless once its veto power is stripped away. Id.
"Id.
"Id.
1"Id.
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the Court pronounced, "legislative
actions.. .cannot amend, modify,
rescind, or supplant any rule
promulgated by an agency unless
the legislature follows the bill
passage requirements."o'0 Since an
action by the legislature to suspend
an administrative rule is necessarily
a legislative action, it is subject to
the constitutional mandates for bill
passage.' 2
The next issue the Court
had to face was justiciability. JCAR
asserted that the case was mooted
by either the fact that the statute was
amended or by the withdrawal of
the final order of rulemaking by
DNR. 03 The Court found this
argument unpersuasive in spite of
the trial court's ruling.'"
It
as
the
statute,
that
elaborated
amended in 1995, did not "eliminate that nature of the controversy
alleged." 0 The court explained
that the amended version still
allowed for violation of the
constitution's passage and presentment requirements, in that it
provided for a thirty-day suspension and a complete veto upon
action by the legislature without
presentment of such action to the

govemor.'0" In short, the Court
maintained that "a case is not
mooted when the controversy
continues regardless of the amendment. Here, essentially the same
constitutional infirmity infects both
the earlier and later versions of the
0 The case for mandamus
statute."'1
was also not mooted, the court
added, because once the Secretary
of State improperly refused to
publish the order, "the rule was, for
purposes of this litigation, promulgated."'" Since it was promulgated, section 536.021.5 mandated
that it could only be withdrawn by a
"subsequent order of rulemaking
that is first published as a proposed
rule, permitted to be commented
on," and published.'" Thus, a
proposed rule cannot be withdrawn
by an agency, alleging a mistake
was made, without following the
proper procedure of section
536.021."1o

The Court then examined
the issue of ripeness, summarily
dismissing respondents' claim that
since JCAR had taken no action
against the proposed regulation, the
case was not ripe for adjudication."' Like individual standing,

this issue also failed to obstruct a
decision on the merits."' 2 In short,
the court asserted, JCAR's inaction
was not at issue."' What did matter
was not JCAR's action or inaction,
but the Secretary of State's refusal
to publish the rule based upon
section 260.225."4 Thus, the court
found the case was indeed ripe with
respect to the rule's promulgation." 5
The Court did not elaborate
on the question of severability. It
acknowledged that subsection 7 of
260.225 seems to make the relationship between agency rulemaking
authority and legislative review of
agency rules interdependent." 6 In
fact, the statute provides that section
260.225's grant of authority to
JCAR is "nonseverable" with the
legislature's delegation of authority
to executive agencies to promulgate
regulations."' However, the Court
interpreted the "review power" of
JCAR not necessarily as a legislative veto power, but as the general
power inherent in the legislature to
review the agencies it creates."
Thus, since the legislature continued to wield oversight authority
over executive agencies even with-

"1d.
"'d.at 135.
'MId.
05
1d.
17Id.

108d.
"'Id.at 136.
nold.
"'Id.
2
11
1d.
"'Id
"'Id.
"'See Mo. REv. STAT. § 260.225.7(Supp. 1990) which states: "[t]he provisions of this section are nonseverable and the grant of rulemaking
authority is essentially dependent on the reviewpower vested with the committee. Ifthereviewpowerisheldunconstitutional or invalid, the
grant ofrulemaking authority and any rule promulgated under such rulemaking authority shall also be invalid or void."
"'Mo. Coalition for the Env't, 948 S.W.2d at 136.
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out a legislative veto
Court reasoned that
was not an issue."' 9
V. COMMENT
In assessing
outcome of the instant

power, the
severability
the likely
decision on

Missouri, Chadha's effect on the

federal government may provide
guidance.

Chadha has had its

critics, Justice White and thenJustice Rehnquist chief among
them, and there is no doubt that the
instant decision can be criticized in
the same way.12 0 Some argue that
Chadhahas had a negative effect on
not only the federal administrative
state, but also constitutional separation of powers as well.'21 The
wisdom of the instant decision, like
that of Chadha, largely depends

upon its future effects on the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers in Missouri.
The likely effect of the
instant decision on Missouri law has
been, and will continue to be,
immense. The state administrative
state, not to mention the balance of

Constitutionality of Missouri Legislative Veto
power within state government has a likewise interested legislator, sat
and will still be significantly on JCAR. Now that the Supreme
affected. Missouri has endowed Court has removed this potential
JCAR with extensive authority- hurdle to administrative action, the
more, in fact, than any other state.' 22 DNR and other agencies should feel
Thus, other states, who might have the relief of no longer having to
looked on Missouri as the last great worry about the General Assembly's
bastion of legislative supremacy "fooled you!" mentality regarding
over the administrative state, are delegation of rulemaking authority.
now likely to see the Missouri
Like Chadha, the Missouri
Supreme Court's decision as the Supreme Court's decision will
comet that will cause the inevitable almost certainly have its detractors.
extinction of the legislature's behe- Perhaps the most volatile issue the
moth dinosaur. A ripple effect Court explained away in its opinion
throughout the states is almost was severability.
The Court
certain to result.
interpreted JCAR's "review power"
The effect of the decision as the general power within the
may reverberate loudly at home too. legislature as a whole to review and
No doubt, JCAR's previously exert oversight on executive agenunchecked power has had a chilling cies.' 2
This is an intentional
effect on the rules agencies promul- misreading of the statute in order to
gate. In particular, the DNR may avoid the consequences of the
have thought twice before promul- legislature's condition. Even if the
gating a rule that would have a Court could honestly say it believed
negative fiscal impact on the the legislature intended this general
University of Missouri's coal- meaning of review power, it had
burning power plant, for instance, only to look to the even clearer
when a former university curator, or language of its 1993 amendment,

"9While its interpretation ofthe severability provision may have been justified inpast versions ofthe statute, more recent developments tend
to demonstrate that the legislature did, in fact, intend to make its delegation ofauthority to agencies dependent upon an operable legislative
veto power. In its legislative session since the Court's ruling in Mo. Coalition for the Env 't, the General Assembly has amended its
Administrative Procedure and Review statute. The amendment inserted thirteen new sections in lieu ofseven sections which it repealed.
Most relevant to the subject of this Note, § 536.024 (relating to filing requirements with the JCAR) was modified and §536.028 (relating
to severability, etc.) was created. While the filing requirements ofagency rules with the JCAR remained unchanged, the guidelines the JCAR
is to follow in disapproving rules was moved to § 536.028. The JCAR was also directed to file its recommendations specifically with the
appropriations committees of both houses.
Most significant in the amendment are the waiting period and presentment requirements imposed by §
536.028.8-,9, directing the Secretary of State to withhold publication of the final order ofrulemaking until 30 days after the JCARhas made
its recommendations regarding the rule to the General Assembly. If the Assembly passes a resolution regarding the rule, the rule is held in
limbo until the resolution is presented to and approved or rejected by the Governor.
The amendment also adds clarification and emphasis on severability and legislative intent. Section 536.028.1 declares: "[t]he
delegation of authority to any state agency to propose to the general assembly rules as provided under this section is contingent upon the
agency complying with the provisions ofthis chapter and this delegation oflegislative power to the agency.-.is contingent and dependent upon
the power of the general assembly to review such proposed order ofrulemaking.. and to disapprove and annul any rule or portion thereof
contained in such order of rulemaking." Section 536.028.10 further explains: "[tihe provisions of this section [and agency rulemaking
authority] are nonseverable and the delegation of legislative authority to an agency to propose orders ofrulemaking is essentially dependent
upon the powers vested with the general assembly as provided herein. If any of the powers vested with the general assembly or the joint
committee on administrative rules to review...or to disapprove and annul a rule or portion ofa nmle contained in an order ofrulemaking, are
held unconstitutional or invalid, the purported grant ofrulemaking authority and any rule so proposed...shall be revoked and shall be null,
void and unenforceable."
See generally, H.B. No. 850, 1st Regular Sess. (Mo. 1997).
'See generally,Chadla,462 U.S. 919.
"'See generally, Robert F. Nagel, The Legislative Veto, the Constitution, and the Courts, 3 CoNsT. Comeirr 61 (1986).
22
' See Dean, supra note 2, at 1215.
'23See supra note 37.
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where the legislature replaced the slightly different from their federal
words "review power" with "the counterparts; for while legislative
power of the joint committee on vetoes still lurk in congressional
administrativerules to review and statutes, they have been economisuspend rules pending ratification cally stricken from the Missouri
by the [General Assembly]." 2 4 administrative environment. Even
Clearly, the legislature intended its though the Missouri Supreme Court
review power to specifically refer to held that a presumption of validity
in statutes remains, and a statute will
the legislative veto.'
Aside from the opinion's not be stricken absent clear contrainternal reasoning problems, lack of diction with the Missouri Constitulegislative veto power itself may be tion, Missouri legislators have
detrimental. While the members of received notice that this is such a
the Missouri Supreme Court all case and they will lose if they try
concurred in their judgment, those again.129
In the wake of the Court's
on the U.S. Supreme Court did not
and voiced their concerns for ruling, the legislature must now
canceling Congress' veto authority. decide how to proceed without its
In particular, Justice White's dis- powerful check on executive agenAs Congress did after
sent in Chadha decried the over- cies.
26
turning of the veto provision.' In Chadha, the Missouri legislature
his now-famous words, White must now confront new decisions.
declared that the Court had gone too It must decide whether to legislate
far, for not only did it invalidate one "more clumsily," keeping its delprovision of federal statute, it egation of rulemaking authority to
"sound[ed] the death knell for executive agencies inordinately narnearly 200 other statutory provi- row or rigid.o30 In addition, it must
sions in which Congress has also decide whether to be deterred
reserved a legislative veto."127 This, in its delegation of rulemaking
he believed, was incomprehensible. authority in the future, or on the
In Missouri, the legislature contrary, whether to grant broad
had reserved to itself a legislative authority and, in essence, "pass3 the
veto in almost 180 statutes.'12 buck" to the executive branch.' 1 It
However, the fate of these statutes is must now decide how to shape its

future method of delegation and
how vigorously to pursue its other
oversight capabilities. In the face of
the legislature's amendment of the
statute since the Court's decision,
the Court will likely be forced to
revisit the issue fairly soon.3 2
VI. CoNCLUSION

Fourteen years after
Chadha, the Missouri Supreme
Court has finally declared the
legislative veto in Missouri unconstitutional. It has pronounced that
the unilateral declaration by the
legislature, without presentment to
the Governor and hence not by
legislation, voiding an executive
agency rule violates separation of
powers. But the fact that the Court
struck down the 1990 version of the
legislative veto leaves doubts as to
whether subsequent versions of the
veto are also unconstitutional,
particularly the 1997 amendment
requiring a mandatory waiting
period and presentment to the
Governor if the General Assembly
adopts JCAR's recommendation. If
the judiciary is called upon to face
this issue again, the new face and
structure of the veto provisions and
reinvigorated obstacles like severability may prove more problematic
for it to overcome.

'14See Mo. REv. STAT. § 260.225.4 (Supp. 1993) (emphasis supplied).
"'Seesupm notes 90 and 92 for further clarification of the legislature's intent on severability.
u'Chadha,462 U.S. at 967 (White, J. dissenting).
127g.

"Dean, supra note 2, at 1157.
Mo. Coalition for the Env't, 948 S.W.2d at 132.

"'Nagel, supra note 94, at 62-63.
131Id.
'In addition to strengthening nonseverability, theAssemblyhas ostensiblycountered the Court's Presentment Clause argument by requiring
all disapproval resolutions to be presented to the Governor. See supra note 92.
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